Abstract : Leveraging Web 2.0 technologies in public services provision, citizens are no longer passive public service receivers only; rather, they are encouraged to actively participate in and contribute to public services co-production. However, with a still relatively low contribution rate, how to attract heterogeneous citizens to actively engage in such public services is therefore a critical issue. Adopting a service dominant logic perspective, this paper aims to examine the public service co-production as a holistic service system by deploying an agent-based simulation approach. More specifically, we unfold public goods game to examine how to promote heterogeneous citizens' collective behaviors of engaging in public service co-production along with the resulted enrichment of public services. In addition, we integrate a learning mechanism to examine the influence from both online and offline environment towards contributing to public services. A set of scenario analyses is conducted at both the aggregated level and meso-level to support policy evaluation. Simulation results suggest frequent government support and interactions with citizens may encourage more citizens to contribute to the service co-production, and smaller communities with more capable citizens are of a higher rate of contribution. In contrast, community-based learning may not be an effective strategy to promote service co-production compared with the government support.
Introduction
In recent years, with the advent of Web 2.0 technologies, the paradigm of public services is shifting to public information creation, service co-production, solution creation and policy making collaborated between the government and citizens [1] . By leveraging the advantages of Web 2.0 platforms as a new way of communicating with citizens, the public sector aims to raise and sustain citizens' interest and engagement in extensive public affairs, and further to tackle regional social problems collaboratively.
Experimental open government initiatives have been implemented in some countries such as U.S., Japan and Singapore albeit without a comprehensive academic understanding yet [2] . However, according to the UN E-government survey 2014 [3] , although the adoption rate of using the Internet to interact with public sectors is relatively high, usage disparity among social groups is obvious, and the usage rate of more complicated services is still relatively low. Consequently, how to encourage citizens to actively engage in public services and further to raise their interests in extensive public affairs are challenging issues. Furthermore, without understanding citizens' collaborative motivations and behaviours, it might be hard for the public sector to design effective policies cultivating such engagement in public services [4] . Therefore, this paper aims to explore heterogeneous citizens' babaviours towards engaging in public services co-production as a holistic service system.
In literature, there have been works devoted to proposing frameworks for analyzing citizen sourcing phenomenon [5] and exploring factors and co-relations of citizens' motivation to-wards co-production of public services [6] , [7] . However, there are few studies to 1) formulate the service co-production as a dynamic and evolving service system with a service-dominant logic paradigm [8] , and 2) analyze the underlying mechanisms which may prompt citizen co-production of public services along with the improvement of public services. Traditional research methods, such as surveys and analytic models, might be insufficient to catch the co-evolved service provision process and to handle the system complexity. Therefore, alternative methodologies are expected to complement such system design and to support policy making. In this work, agent-based simulation [9] is deployed to capture the heterogeneous characteristics of services and citizens, and to explore their collective behaviours influenced by both online and offline activities as a holistic system.
On the other hand, the mechanisms of promoting cooperation and collective behaviors in public goods context have been extensively explored by conducting lab and field experiments [10] . Public goods game is one of such tools and particularly suitable to examine pro-social behaviors within groups [11] . Several set-up factors (e.g. communication, groupsize, repeated game, etc.) and mechanisms (e.g. punishment) have been studied to examine their influences on cooperation [10] , [12] - [15] . Furthermore, besides homogeneous stakeholders, heterogeneous stakeholders have also been considered in experiments [16] . In order to handle large-scale applications and to integrate the learning mechanisms and interactions among individuals, we unfold the public goods game to agentbased models for capturing the dilemma between individual interests and collective benefits in the open government context.
To elaborate citizens' adaptive behaviours towards collectively contributing to online public services, the contribution of this paper therefore is twofold. First, we propose an agent-based framework to conceptualize the public service coproduction system as a holistic system by identifying main stakeholders and their relations. Based on this framework, public policies that aim to promote citizens' active engagement to the public services are proposed and evaluated. Second, we unfold and revise the public goods game to agent-based models to formalize the dynamics among citizens, based on which community-based learning mechanisms are integrated.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows: conceptual framework and agent-based models are proposed in Section 2 with a detailed explanation; simulation and scenario analyses at both macro-level and meso-level are discussed in Sections 3 and 4; conclusion with some future work discussion is presented in the last section.
Conceptual Framework
Different from the concept of treating services as static entities, a service system is a dynamic and open adaptive system of which the service providers and receivers themselves are adaptive systems as well [8] . Within such systems, divergent stakeholders might expect different things and possess their own decision-making process; individual goals might not align with collective goals; and thus the involved relations are ambiguous and hard to manage. In addition, service receivers from different social groups/communities participate in and influence the dynamic service delivery process directly or indirectly, and thus play a key role in the whole service system. Upon adopting this service-dominant logic, we treat open public services as a coproduction process involving both the heterogeneous citizens and the public sector.
Linders [2] provided a typology of public service coproduction leveraging social media. We adopt his definitions and embed them in the assumptions of our agent-based models. The conceptual framework is depicted in Fig. 1 .
• Three types of service co-production were defined according to [2] . Citizen Sourcing: the major responsibility is on the public sector side while citizens influence the service outcomes; Government as a Platform: the public sector just provides open data through its platform which could be leveraged by citizens for their own benefit; Do it Yourself Government: citizens self-organize activities to cultivate citizen-to-citizen public service co-production while the public sector only provides a public available framework.
• Citizens are heterogeneous with different level of ability and motivation to engage in public services' coproduction. In addition, they are not rational agents who pursue to maximize or optimize their payoffs. Rather, they are agents who are adaptive to other agents' behaviours and the environment. Specifically, citizens will improve their ability of contribution through communitylevel learning, and adjust their strategies (of contribution) influenced by other citizens' behaviors.
• Communities are defined as sets of citizens within which citizens' ability of engagement could be evolved through learning, whereas the reward of contributing to public service is beyond the community border. In other words, all citizens could enjoy the public services since they are ubiquitous through the Internet whilst they can only learn directly from others within the same community. Fig. 1 Conceptual framework of the public service co-production system.
Public Goods Game
We briefly review the public goods game in this section as follows. The payoff C i of each player i, out of n players, playing public goods game is defined as
where y is the initial endowment each player receives, g i ≤ y is the portion each player wants to contribute to public goods, and
g i indicates the gain of each player, 0 < α < 1.
The rationale of choosing public goods game is that with respect to public service co-production, citizens may be prone to contribute individually or collectively if they are satisfied with a particular issue or they believe their contribution could improve the issue, rather than seeking to maximize their benefit [17] . Therefore, the endowment g i is treated as their effort and contribution to the public services, α n i=1 g i is the collectively created service contents of a particular issue, and the resulted payoff C i captures citizens' gain of contribution. On the other side, different from conventional public goods game of which only homogeneous agents are involved, we allow agents to be heterogeneous as possessing different values of the initial endowment y and different ability to contribute [16] .
Agent-Based Modeling
We define two types of agents, Citizen agent and Public Service agent. Each Citizen agent belongs to one and only one community composed of 5 to 10 agents, which possesses a set of variables depending on the properties of involved agents. The details are explained in the following.
Citizen Agent
Citizen set is defined as D = {1, 2, . . . , n}, where n is the number of citizens. Citizens within different communities will play public goods game. The heterogeneity of citizens is defined in terms of the ability to contribute. The strategy space is defined as a discrete set A = {0, 1, 2} where 0 indicates no contribution at all, 1 indicates contributing partially, and 2 indicates contributing fully. 0 may be treated as the situation that citizens do not contribute to public services at all but enjoy the services as "free riders", 1 as only registering to the services and contributing partially, and 2 as actively involved in the content contribution.
The payoff for citizen i ∈ D taking strategy s ∈ A at iteration t is defined as follows,
where y i is the initial endowment representing the ability of citizens to contribute, g i is the endowment or content contributed to public services at each iteration, c i is a parameter adjusting the received endowment from the public sector side based on citizens' strategy: 1 for full contributors, 0.5 for partial contributors and 0 for free riders. G i (t) is citizen's total contribution to the public services including the endowment and effort consumed, and updated as
where E i (t) is the effort or cost of participating in and contributing to public services, which will be evolved through learning within communities at each iteration. η is used to adjust the proportion of effort involved. α = g /(ny i ) is the constant marginal return ranging between 0 and 1. g = g i is the sum of full endowment, i.e. the total endowment of citizens choosing strategy 2 [18] . g is the endowment contributed by the Public Service agent, the value of which depends on the corresponding service type. The probability of choosing strategy s at iteration t for citizen i is defined as follows based on social learning dynamics [19] ,
where W(t) = i∈D C i,s (t)/n is the average endowment contributed to the public services of each citizen, which indicates the indirect influence from other citizens via the online content of public services, and β ∈ (0, 1) is defined to adjust its proportion. The probability of taking each strategy will be normalized as P i,s (t)/ s∈A P i,s (t) to guarantee the total sum is 1.
Community Formed by Citizen Agents
We let community be the unit within which citizens are closely associated [20] . Citizens could obtain information of public services or learn how to use it from the community in which he/she currently resides. Community set is defined as Community = {1, 2, . . . , k}, where k ∈ N is the number of communities. For each of the community i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, a set of variables is defined as shown in Table 1 . 
H i
A set of citizens who are currently involved in community i ∈ {1, . . . , k} N i ∈ N Number of citizens currently involved in community i M i ∈ N Number of active service users who contribute content in community i
Community-Based Learning
We assume citizens could improve their ability of contributing to public services, in terms of consumed effort E i (t), through learning within the community until all members' abilities converge to the same level. The social learning mechanism is adopted from Deguchi's social learning dynamics with educational effect and supporting commitment [19] . E i (t) of citizen i ∈ H l , while i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and l ∈ {1, . . . , k} is updated as follows,
where V l E indicates the average effort level of citizens within community l, in other words the average ability of engaging in public services within the same community. Here we assume citizens within the same community will not directly interact with each other, but be influenced by the status of the community indirectly. U is a parameter considering the influences of the number of active participators. The value of γ, which is used to adjust the influence of community-based learning, is a constant positive real number ranging between 0 and 1.
Public Service Agent
Public services, treated as public goods, is considered as coproduced by both the public sector and citizens through playing public goods game. The quality of public services is conceptualized as the endowment contributed by citizens, as
and manipulated by the government in certain situations, as g . In this work, we assume there is only one Public Service agent defined by the type of services elucidated in Section 2, q ∈ S = {0, 1, 2}. The corresponding endowment g differs among different types of Public Service agent, which indicates extra contents contributed by the Public Service agent. 0 indicates that the public sector contributes no content, such as Do it Yourself Government, 1 indicates that the public sector provides certain information to citizens , such as Government as a Platform, and 2 indicates that public sector responds actively to contents contributed by citizens, such as Citizen Sourcing. Each service may also bear different operational costs. The value of g is determined by the strategy as well as the total endowment from citizens as follows.
Simulation
Regarding the simulation setting, we have 500 heterogeneous citizens allocated to 100 communities randomly at the initial step. This random allocation sets initial groups with different size within which citizens may play the public goods game. The heterogeneity of citizens is represented in terms of their initial endowment y i and effort E i (t) consumed by contributing to public services. We run the simulation for 10 times along 2000 iterations; the average values of strategy selection of 10 runs are depicted for macro-level analysis, whilst meso-level and micro-level analyses are based on simulation results of single runs. A methodological framework for comprehensive analysis of the simulated data at micro-level is out of the scope of this paper and left as future work.
The time unit, i.e. iteration, in this model is more defined in the theoretical sense, rather than corresponding to the time interval in real life applications. Agents change their status at each time unit and make new decisions under the influence of others, thus the resulted pattern change across scenarios is more of interest. Special attention should be paid when trying to interpret the simulation results within the context of real life applications since the meaning of time unit will be changed. 
Parameter Setting
Parameters are set as in Table 2 . It follows the conventional parameter setting of public goods game applied in empirical studies [15] , [16] , to which interesting readers could refer for a detailed explanation. Different values of y i indicate the divergent ability of each citizen, while g i is the content they could contribute at each iteration, fully or partially. E i (t) is set initially as a random number ranging in [ 1 4 y i , 3 4 y i ], β as 0.5, and γ as 0.2. Initially, citizens will choose each strategy randomly and evenly.
Basic Scenarios
In basic scenarios, we do not consider the support from the public sector side, i.e. g = 0 as the public service content is fully contributed by citizens. Figure 2 represents the basic scenarios of (a) the adoption rate of strategy 0 and (b) the adoption rate of strategy 2. Combinations of different values of y i and η are experimented. It is clear that strategy 0 is dominant in all situations, i.e. free riders are primary, which agrees with the results derived from conventional public goods game experiment. Citizens with higher ability to contribute, i.e. y i ∈ [20, 40] , are having a higher adoption rate of strategy 2. The value of η indicates the percentage of effort involved in contribution, and a higher value may decrease the total endowment given to the collective goods, and thus slightly improves the uptake rate of strategy 2, especially at initial stages.
Similarly, Fig. 3 depicts the basic scenarios of (a) the adoption rate of strategy 0 and (b) the adoption rate of strategy 2, with community shuffle at every ten iterations. Here community shuffle means the change of community members randomly. It is similar to the experiment setting that players of public goods game will play with changed group members. In addition, we set the value of η differently for citizens choosing different strategies rather than a constant one: 0.2 for strategy 0, 0.5 for strategy 1 and 0.8 for strategy 2. A mixed population indicates a population of citizens with different y i values. We could observe a similar pattern that free riders are still dominant, while shuffling the community promotes the prevalence of strategy 2 only slightly. Turbulence on strategy 2 adoption is observed under the case of a mixed population, especially when the communities shuffled regularly. It could be explained by the re-initiated learning process within the newly formed communities, which leads to a changing strategy.
Meso-Level Analysis
Furthermore, we could look into citizens' selections within each community at each iteration, as shown in Fig. 4 ((a) y i = 20, (b) y i ∈ [20, 40] , and (c) a mixed population, under the case of different η value and no government support) and Fig. 5 ((a) the adoption rate of strategy 2 and (b) the adoption rate of all strategies).
In Fig. 4, x-axis indicates the iteration number, y-axis indicates the community number and z-axis indicates the take-up rate of strategy 2 of all communities at every 50 iterations. In Fig. 5 (a), x-axis indicates the community size as the number of citizens, while y-axis is the average ability of each community, i.e. V l E , of where a lower value indicates a higher ability. The size of each bubble represents the relative percentage of citizens within each community adopting strategy 2. A larger bubble size indicates a higher strategy 2 adoption rate; in Fig. 5 (b) , xaxis indicates the community number while y-axis is the adoption rate of each strategy at the final iteration under the case of a mixed population corresponding to Fig. 4 (c) .
From Fig. 5 (a) , we could observe that across communities of different sizes, citizens show diverse behaviours in terms of strategy selection. Generally speaking, communities of smaller size and embracing citizens who require little effort to contribute are prone to have a larger number of citizens adopting strategy 2. It is consistent with arguments derived from experiments that community size itself has no determinant impact on collaboration; smaller communities tend to cultivate collaboration more but heterogeneity may lead larger communities to have a variety in collective behaviors [10] , [13] .
Excluding communities with only 1 or 2 citizens, we are more interested in those with more people while holding a high selection rate of strategy 2. Scrutinizing into such particular communities selected from Fig. 4 (a-c) , such as community 98 (consisting citizens of ID 27, 52, 288, and 316 all with α = 0.38) with 100% citizens choosing strategy 2 finally, and community 37 (consisting citizens 23, 164, 168, 363, 402 and 407 with α = 0.30, 0.20, 0.38, 0.38, 0.38 and 0.26 respectively) with 100% selection rate for strategy 0, we could trace the parameters of each citizen along with the simulation, which could provide deeper insights for policy makers. The changing ability of each citizen in these two communities, denoted as E i (t), is shown in Fig. 5 (c) . We could observe that the ability of citizens within the same community converges to the ability level of the most capable citizen, and the community with a better average ability level is prone to have a higher rate of choosing strategy 2. The generated analysis might not be significant in terms of statistical analysis, but would be useful for understanding micro-level dynamics of the systems and for future model validation. In future work, we could experiment more scenarios with different micro-level values, i.e., citizen's parameters to see how the local changes influence the macro-level result.
Public Sector Support Scenarios
In basic scenarios, we do not consider the contribution from the public sector side, whilst in this subsection we aim to examine the impact of direct support in terms of content contribution. This could be interpreted as public sector's response to citizens' contributions, and g could be treated as a negative penalty to those who do not participate but enjoy the public goods. We let public sector contribute at every certain iterations, as the fre- quency of replying to citizens' contribution. Figure 6 and Fig. 7 show the adoption of strategy 2 and the cost-effectiveness of the support respectively, of (a) y i = 20, (b) y i ∈ [20, 40] , and (c) a mixed population with different frequencies of government support. Here the cost-effectiveness of government support is calculated as the the adoption rate of strategy 2 divided by the number of execution times. It shows that strategy 2 becomes dominant after frequent support, though not the case when the support is infrequent. The pattern of this result conforms with the claims of Fehr and Gächter's [15, p.988] empirical public goods experiment. From the cost-effectiveness sub-figures, we could observe that although the adoption rate of strategy 2 is improved when public support is frequently carried out, due to the resulted increased cost, it may not be the best choice for the public sector side.
This situation captures certain aspects of Citizen Sourcing or Government as a Platform that the contribution from the public sector side is important. Depending on the amount of government contribution, the simulation results may vary. Regarding this kind of paradigm, the government support strategies, such as replying promptly to citizens' content, providing more available open data, and designing readable user interface, are important.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this work, we proposed an agent-based framework to conceptualize the public service co-production as a dynamic service system by defining the main agents and their behaviors. Subsequently, we unfolded the public goods game to agentbased models with heterogeneous stakeholders. They capture citizens' behaviours towards public service co-production influenced by both the online and offline activities: the enrichment of public services in terms of content as online influence, and the community-based learning as offline activities. In addition, we simulated and experimented a set of scenarios, the results of which conform with hypotheses derived from experimental studies. The simulation results suggest that public sector support is a more effective strategy on promoting citizens' collection, compared with community-based learning; communities of smaller size and with more competent citizens are prone to cultivate collaboration; citizens with more larger endowment are of a higher contribution rate; and frequent support promotes collaboration, but may be less cost-effective in long term due to the borne accumulated high cost.
Future Work
This work could be treated as the framework to further design better public services and to evaluate relevant policies. Extensive future work is expected. Firstly, we could apply this framework to a particular case of public service co-production by utilizing any available empirical data to calibrate the model parameters and to validate the model. Secondly, it would be hard to profile citizens within certain communities exactly the same as the simulation work did in field work, and it is challenging to capture the dynamic and evolving behavious of citizens by mere survey data or qualitative methods. Therefore, how to triangulate the model construction and validation with data collected through different methodologies could be another research direction. Furthermore, we only focused on the citizen side behaviours of the system, while the public sector side was not fully explored and examined yet. As a holistic and coevolved public service system, the relevant policy evaluation should consider various aspects of the public sector structure as well. Finally, a methodological framework on how to represent and analyze simulated micro-level data comprehensively deserves a full paper which stands on its own, and thus further analysis is expected to be conducted both quantitatively and qualitatively.
